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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
SHELLY HIPWELL, an individual, 
by and through her guardians, 
SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE 
HIPWELL, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
-vs-
ROGER SHARP, TIM W. HEALY, 
and DOES I THROUGH X, 
APPELLEES' BRIEF 
Case No. 920218 
Priority No. 11 
Defendants/Appellants. 
I. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Third Judicial District Court denied Appellants1 
Motions for Summary Judgment on March 30, 1992 and this Court 
granted Appellants' Joint Petition for Permission to Appeal 
the Interlocutory Order on June 23, 1992. This Appeal is 
properly before the Court pursuant to Utah Constitution, 
Article VIII, § 3 and Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(g) and (j) 
(Supp. 1992). 
II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether this Court properly determined in 
Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), 
that the damage limitation contained in the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act (the "Act") was unconstitutional under the Utah 
Constitution as applied to the University Hospital. 
2. Whether the 1987 Amendment to the Act (the 
"1987 Amendment"), which purported to define any activity 
undertaken by any governmental entity as a governmental 
function, removed the constitutional infirmities of the 
previous version of the Act and validated the Act's damage 
limitation. 
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III. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Utah Constitution, Article I, §§ 7, 10, 11 and 24 and 
Utah Constitution, Article V, § 1, attached hereto at Appendix 
"A11. 
Sections 63-30-2, 63-30-3 and 63-30-34 of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1, et seq. 
as they existed in January of 1989, attached hereto at 
Appendix "B". 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedings 
Below. 
Appellee Shelly Hipwell ("Mrs. Hipwell") suffered 
catastrophic and permanent brain damage when her heart was 
punctured by a Resident at the University of Utah Hospital 
while improperly performing a bone marrow biopsy in December, 
1988. Appellants were then retained to pursue recovery on 
behalf of Mrs. Hipwell against all the health care providers 
who treated her, including the McKay-Dee Hospital and the 
University Hospital. 
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In May, 1989, shortly after Appellants were retained 
to represent Mrs. Hipwell, without even filing a lawsuit or 
conducting any meaningful investigation, and with the 
understanding and specific acknowledgement that this Court in 
Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), 
had struck down the $250,000.00 statutory damage cap 
theretofore in effect for the University Hospital, Appellants 
agreed to settle Mrs. Hipwell's catastrophic injuries for a 
meager $250,000.00 from the University Hospital. Appellants 
obtained court approval for this settlement through admitted 
misrepresentations to the probate court concerning the extent 
of their investigation of Mrs. Hipwell's condition and the 
underlying facts. Further, Appellants negligently failed to 
investigate and pursue any recovery against McKay-Dee 
Hospital. Appellants also negligently failed to cause the 
proceeds from the settlement with the University Hospital to 
be paid into a trust, resulting in the Social Security 
Administration receiving all of the settlement payments being 
made for Mrs. Hipwell's care. 
Shortly after this lawsuit was filed on behalf of Mrs. 
Hipwell, Appellants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, 
seeking dismissal of the Complaint on the basis that the 
Resident at the University Hospital who punctured and 
lacerated Mrs. Hipwellfs heart was an employee of the 
University of Utah School of Medicine, not the University 
Hospital. Appellants contended that the University Hospital 
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was therefore not liable for Mrs. Hipwell's injuries and that 
the $250,000.00 settlement was reasonable as a matter of law 
because this Courtfs decision in Condemarin only applied to 
the University Hospital. Appellants acknowledged that the 
damage limits were unconstitutional. When Mrs. Hipwell 
demonstrated in her Reply Memorandum that the argument was 
without foundation, Appellants jettisoned that theory and then 
filed what they acknowledged was in effect a new summary 
judgment motion. 
In the new Motion for Summary Judgment, the principal 
argument raised by Appellants was that the Utah legislature's 
1991 Amendment of § 63-30-3(2) (purporting to define certain 
limited activities of the University Hospital, including the 
treatment of high risk patients transferred from other 
hospitals, as a governmental function) and the legislature's 
enactment in 1991 of a new damage limitation in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-34 (limiting recovery for negligence arising out of 
any treatment by the University Hospital to $250,000.00), 
should be retroactively applied to Mrs. Hipwell's claim, thus 
rendering the $250,000.00 settlement reasonable as a matter of 
law. In passing, Appellants also asserted that the 
legislature's 1987 Amendment to § 63-30-2 of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act defining any act or failure to act 
of any governmental entity as a "governmental function" cured 
the constitutional problems identified by this Court in 
Condemarin, thus rendering the $250,000.00 damage limitation 
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constitutional and the settlement reasonable as a matter of 
law. 
When Mrs. Hipwell then demonstrated that Appellants1 
retroactivity arguments were groundless, Appellants regrouped, 
abandoned their retroactivity argument and filed yet another 
memorandum, placing all their emphasis on the arguments that 
Condemarin was wrongly decided because the state was 
absolutely immune from suit at common law and the 1987 
Amendment, which simply relabeled everything that a 
governmental entity did as "governmental," somehow avoided the 
constitutional infirmities with the damage limitation which 
this Court struck down in Condemarin. The District Court 
properly rejected those arguments and denied Appellants1 
Motion for Summary Judgment, finding the damage limitation 
unconstitutional. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. On December 13, 1988, 26-year-old Shelly Hipwell 
was admitted as a patient to McKay-Dee Medical Center in 
Ogden, Utah suffering complications in connection with her 
pregnancy. [R. 309]. 
2. Mrs. Hipwell was treated at McKay-Dee by Dr. 
Michael J. Healy ("Dr. Healy"), her obstetrician. [R. 310]. 
3. Incident to the birth of her second child through 
cesarean section at McKay-Dee on December 13, 1988, Mrs. 
6 
Hipwell suffered from, inter alia. HELLP syndrome, Adult 
Respiratory Distress Syndrome, a severe infection of unknown 
origin and, as part thereof, suffered a ruptured liver and 
consequential severe infection. At the time, Mrs. Hipwell was 
in a condition of hemorrhagic shock. [R. 310]. 
4. At the instructions of McKay-Dee Hospital, Mrs. 
Hipwell was transferred to the University Hospital as a 
patient on December 23, 1988. [R. 310]. At the time of 
transfer, the limitation on damages applied to the University 
Hospital, but not the McKay-Dee Hospital. 
5. At the time Mrs. Hipwell was admitted, it was 
intended that she be a patient of the University of Utah 
Hospital and under the care of persons under the control and 
responsibility of the University Hospital. [R. 310-311]. 
6. Dr. John R. Weis ("Dr. Weis") was a resident 
physician who apparently regularly performed medical services 
for patients at the University Hospital. 
7. On January 18, 1989, during an attempted bone 
marrow biopsy on Mrs. Hipwell's sternum, Dr. Weis punctured 
and lacerated Mrs. Hipwell's heart, resulting in severe brain 
damage, rendering Mrs. Hipwell totally and permanently 
disabled and later resulting in her death on May 27, 1992. [R. 
311]. Plaintiff believes that Dr. Weis had never performed 
such a biopsy and was not supervised in any manner by the 
University Hospital. [R. 311]. 
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8. On February 10, 1989, Appellants Healy and Sharp 
were retained by Mrs. Hipwell^ family to represent her in a 
medical malpractice action. [R. 311]. 
9. On April 13, 1989, Mrs. Hipwell was transferred 
back to McKay-Dee from the University Hospital. [R. 312]. 
10. In April, 1989, Sharp and Healy received an offer 
from the University Hospital to settle Mrs. Hipwell1s case for 
$250,000.00, the maximum amount that could then be obtained 
from the University under the statutory cap. [R. 312]. 
11. On May 1, 1989, the Utah Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 
(Utah 1989), holding the statutory cap unconstitutional at 
least as to the University Hospital. [R. 312]. 
12. On May 6, 1989, with knowledge that this Court 
had ruled the statutory cap unconstitutional, Sharp and Healy 
agreed to settle Mrs. Hipwellfs case for the sum of 
$250,000.00, subject to approval of the Utah probate court. 
No counteroffer whatsoever was made by Sharp and Healy to the 
Universityfs original offer, notwithstanding that this Court 
had struck down the statutory cap. No litigation was even 
filed on Mrs. Hipwell!s behalf. [R. 312]. 
13. On May 15, 1989, the Utah probate court approved 
Mrs. Hipwellfs settlement based solely on representations made 
by Sharp to the court. [R. 312]. 
14. A few days after being retained to represent Mrs. 
Hipwell, Sharp was advised by co-counsel Healy that Healy's 
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brother, Dr. Healy, who was Mrs. Hipwell's attending physician 
at McKay-Dee Hospital, felt that medical malpractice in Mrs. 
Hipwell's case was very clear and that the case should not 
involve the need for litigation and should result in a 
sizeable settlement. [R. 314]. 
15. Sharp admitted that the effective evaluation of a 
medical negligence claim involves securing all relevant 
medical records, including X-rays and CT studies as well as 
all historical evidence pertaining to the potential client and 
conducting interviews regarding the circumstances of the case. 
[R. 314]. 
16. Sharp and Healy did not obtain a complete set of 
medical records from Mrs. Hipwell's first period of time of 
McKay-Dee on 12-13-88 to 12-23-88. This was the period of 
time that she was under the care of Dr. Healy, brother of 
Healy. [R. 314]. 
17. Sharp and Healy did not obtain a complete set of 
medical records from the University Hospital for the period of 
time (12-23-88 to 4-13-89), during which Mrs. Hipwell's heart 
was lacerated during the attempted sternal bone marrow biopsy. 
[R. 314-315]. 
18. Sharp and Healy did not obtain any records from 
McKay-Dee during Mrs. Hipwell's second stay there, which 
commenced on April 13, 1989 and continued through the time 
that Mrs. Hipwell's case was settled. [R. 315]. 
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19. Sharp and Healy did not speak with any medical 
witnesses who were involved in Mrs. Hipwell's care at the time 
her heart was lacerated. [R. 315]. 
20. Sharp and Healy received their information 
regarding how their client was injured solely from the 
attorney for the University Hospital. No independent 
investigation was conducted. [R. 315]. 
21. Sharp and Healy never spoke with Dr. Weis, the 
resident who lacerated Mrs. Hipwell's heart during the sternal 
bone marrow biopsy. [R. 315]. 
22. Sharp and Healy do not know how Dr. Weis managed 
to puncture their client's heart. [R. 316]. 
23. Sharp and Healy did not obtain any independent 
medical opinion regarding whether Dr. Weis or anyone else was 
negligent with regard to the heart laceration that occurred 
during the bone marrow biopsy on Mrs. Hipwell. [R. 317]. 
24. Sharp and Healy did not interview any witnesses, 
including the two residents directly in charge of Mrs. 
Hipwell's care at the time of the malpractice at the 
University Hospital. Those residents, Kerry Paape and Edward 
Raines, were and are of the opinion that the bone marrow 
aspiration was done in a negligent manner. [R. 317]. 
25. In point of fact, Sharp and Healy never saw Mrs. 
Hipwell. [R. 318]. 
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26. Although Sharp never met Mrs. Hipwell [Sharp 
Depo., p. 15], Sharp was aware that Mrs. Hipwell was in a coma 
and was "pain sensitive only." [R. 327]. 
27. Sharp has handled a number of catastrophic injury 
cases, but has never had a client more catastrophically 
injured than Mrs. Hipwell. Mrs. Hipwell was as badly injured 
as any client that Sharp has ever had. [R. 327]. 
28. Sharp has seen other catastrophic brain injury 
cases in which future care was projected into the five to ten 
million dollar range [R. 329]. 
29. Sharp did not consult with any damage expert who 
could have evaluated the future potential cost of Mrs. 
Hipwell's care. [R. 329]. 
30. Sharp never performed any calculation or 
conducted any estimate of what Mrs. Hipwell's loss of wages 
were up to the time of settlement. [R. 330]. 
31. Sharp never conducted any investigation or made 
any estimate of Mrs. Hipwell's loss of earning capacity. [R. 
330] . 
32. Sharp never had any contract with any 
rehabilitative health care provider that could give him any 
information about long term care, needs or costs. [R. 330]. 
33. Sharp recognized at the time that he settled Mrs. 
Hipwell's case that, under the terms of the settlement, Mrs. 
Hipwell would be netting less than her medical bills incurred 
up to that point. [R. 330]. 
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34. Sharp received a fee for his services in handling 
the Hipwell case of $34,500.00. [R. 330]. 
35. Sharp advised the probate court: 
M
. . . I have carefully gone through all the 
medical records from McKay-Dee Hospital until the 
time she was ultimately transferred to the 
University of Utah Hospital . . . " 
Sharp admits that this was not true. [R. 330]. 
36. Sharp and Healy did not present the probate court 
with any affidavits from anyone regarding any aspect of Mrs. 
Hipwellfs case. The probate court made its decision approving 
the Hipwell settlement solely upon what it was told by Sharp. 
The court had no independent means of determining whether what 
Sharp was telling it was accurate or complete. [R. 330-331]. 
37. No independent guardian ad litem was selected to 
give an independent evaluation to the probate court. [R. 
331]. 
38. With regard to the impact of the Condemarin 
decision on the Hipwell case, Sharp advised the probate court: 
"The current status of the law is there is no 
longer a cap against the University Medical 
Center. They're treated as all health care 
provider institutions in the state, and there is 
no caps.,f 
[R. 331]. 
39. Mrs. Hipwell died on May 27, 1992. [R. 728]. Up 
to the time of her death, Social Security took all of the 
settlement annuity payments from the family in exchange for 
providing Social Security benefits. 
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V. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. This Court correctly decided in Condemarin that 
the governmental/proprietary distinction applied to the state 
at common law and that the damage limitation violated the open 
courts provision of the Utah Constitution by restricting the 
right to sue the state for damages for injuries suffered at a 
state-owned hospital. Although the courts did not have 
occasion to apply that distinction to the state at common law 
prior to the adoption of the Utah Constitution because the 
role of the state had not expanded to the point that the state 
was performing proprietary functions, no Utah case has ever 
held that the distinction was not applicable to the state at 
common law. Although there is a split of authority in other 
states about whether the distinction applies at common law, 
there is no reasoned basis for treating the state differently 
from other governmental entities with respect to the 
governmental/ proprietary distinction. The correct analysis 
should focus on what activities of any governmental entity 
were considered proprietary at the time the Utah Constitution 
was adopted and were thus not protected by governmental 
immunity. This is the analysis that Condemarin utilized in 
deciding the open courts issue. Thus, the legislature's 
substantial restriction of this right by passing the damage 
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limitation violated the open courts provision contained in 
Article I § 11 of the Utah Constitution. 
2. If the damage limitation were otherwise upheld, 
that limitation would violate the open courts provision 
because the Utah Governmental Immunity Act immunized all 
individual health care providers, including individuals, from 
liability for their negligence without providing a reasonable 
substitute remedy. The substitution of the right to sue the 
state for up to $250,000.00 is not a reasonable substitute 
remedy for the right to sue health care providers for 
unlimited damages. 
3. The damage limitation violates due process and 
equal protection for the reasons stated by this Court in 
Condemarin. Even if it is assumed for argument that the 
damage limitation does not violate the open courts provision 
of the Utah Constitution, the Condemarin Court correctly 
utilized a heightened scrutiny standard in determining the 
constitutionality of the damage limitation on the basis that 
the damage limitation severely restricted important 
substantive rights of individuals to recover for personal 
injuries, which is a substantial property right. At the time 
the damage limitation was enacted by the legislature, the 
citizens of this state had a right to full recovery for 
injuries inflicted at a state-owned hospital. The damage 
limitation drastically restricted that right. 
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4. Even if the court were to employ a rational basis 
standard in judging the constitutionality of the damage 
1imitation, that limitation is unconstitutional as a violation 
of equal protection and due process. The only justification 
offered for the damage limitation either on the floor of the 
legislature or by Appellants, is the fiscal protection of the 
state treasury and the University Hospital. However, as in 
Condemarin, there has been absolutely no factual showing, 
either in the legislative history or before the District 
Court, that the recovery limitation is reasonably necessary 
for the preservation of the public treasury, that it is 
urgently and overwhelmingly necessary, that the amount of the 
limitation has any reasonable basis, or that a much less 
drastic alternative was not available. No such showing can be 
made. At the very least, issues of fact exist in this regard. 
5. The 1987 Amendment to the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act did not cure the constitutional problems with the 
damage limitation. Condemarin did not strike down the damage 
limitation only because the operation of a state-owned 
hospital had not been labeled by the legislature as a 
governmental function. Rather, other classifications in the 
statute rendered the limitation unconstitutional. Moreover, 
the legislature cannot arbitrarily define everything that any 
governmental entity does to be a governmental function and 
thereby immunize proprietary activities. The standard for 
determining what is a governmental function is whether the 
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activity under consideration is of such a unique nature that 
it can only be performed by a governmental agency or is 
essential to the core of governmental activity. This Court 
observed in Condemarin that the operation of the University 
Hospital is not a governmental function in the constitutional 
sense and that the legislature by enacting the statute cannot 
resolve the constitutional issue as to what is and is not a 
governmental function. 
In fact, it is clear that the legislature itself did 
not believe that the 1987 Amendment validated the statutory 
damage cap after Condemarin. When the legislature enacted the 
1991 Amendment it believed that Condemarin had invalidated the 
expansion of governmental immunity contained in the 1987 
Amendment and the legislature then purported to define cetrtain 
limited activities of the University Hospital as governmental 
functions because they were "unique or essential to the core 
of governmental activity." In 1991, the legislature also 
enacted a new damage limitation. 
Finally, when Appellants settled Mrs. Hipwellfs 
injures they did so in the belief that the damage limitation 
had been invalidated; they did not believe that the 1987 
Amendment had validated the limitation. 
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VI. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellants erroneously argue that this Court was wrong 
in holding in Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 
(Utah 1989), that the damage limitation contained in Utah Code 
Annotated §63-30-34 violated the open courts provision 
contained in Article I § 11 of the Utah Constitution. 
Appellants assert this Court fell into this supposed error 
because the Court mistakenly believed that under the common 
law, at the time the Utah Constitution was enacted, 
proprietary functions of the State of Utah were not immune 
when in fact, so the argument goes, the state was absolutely 
immune from liability no matter what kind of activity it 
entered into. Appellants conclude that the damage limitation 
therefore did not restrict any right in existence at that time 
and the open courts provision of the constitution was not 
violated. 
Proceeding from this faulty premise, Appellants argue 
that because the open courts provision was not violated, this 
Court erroneously applied a heightened scrutiny standard to 
its analysis of the due process and equal protection issues 
raised by the damage limitation and, if a reasonable basis 
standard had been utilized, no violation of the due process or 
equal protection clauses would have been found. Finally, 
Appellants incredibly contend that the 1987 Amendment in any 
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event eliminated any constitutional concerns over the damage 
limitation by simply defining any activity of any governmental 
entity as a "governmental function." 
For the reasons hereinafter set forth, it is 
respectfully submitted that these arguments are wrong and that 
they spring from a fundamental misinterpretation of this 
Court's decision in Condemarin, other applicable case law and 
the history of governmental immunity in Utah. Condemarin was 
correctly decided by this Court and renders the damage 
limitation in this case unconstitutional on its face. 
A. THE DAMAGE LIMITATION VIOLATES THE OPEN COURTS 
PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
1. The Governmental/Proprietary Distinction Applies 
to All Governmental Entities. 
Appellants' argument that all activities of the state 
were immune at common law and that the governmental/ 
proprietary distinction only applied to municipalities is 
without merit. 
It is true, as Appellants argue, that prior to the 
adoption of the Utah Constitution the application of the 
governmental/proprietary distinction had only been occasioned 
in the context of cases involving municipalities. That does 
not mean, however, that the distinction was only applicable to 
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municipalities, and no Utah case has so held. The plain fact 
of the matter is that prior to the adoption of the Utah 
Constitution almost 100 years ago, the state only performed 
governmental functions. The role of the state had not yet 
expanded so that it was performing proprietary functions as 
were municipalities at the time. Appellants have not and 
cannot point to any state activity at common law when the Utah 
Constitution was adopted that was even remotely proprietary in 
nature. Because of this fact, no case arose giving the courts 
occasion to discuss the governmental/proprietary distinction 
in cases involving state activities prior to the adoption of 
the Constitution. 
Appellants have not cited one Utah case holding that 
the governmental/proprietary distinction did not apply to the 
state at common law and Mrs. Hipwell's counsel has been unable 
to find any such case. In this regard, Appellants1 reliance 
on Bingham v. Board of Education of Oaden City, 223 P.2d 432 
(Utah 1950), to support the proposition that the governmental/ 
proprietary distinction was not applicable to the state is 
misplaced. In fact, Bingham appears to support just the 
opposite view. Bingham involved a claim for personal injuries 
against the Board of Education of Ogden City, which is an 
agency of the State of Utah. In holding that the school board 
was immune, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that, in 
contrast to a municipality, the school board discharged purely 
governmental functions. The Court stated: 
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This distinction is better understood when 
consideration is given to the fact that school 
boards are created exclusively for school 
purposes and are mere agencies of the state 
established for the sole purpose of administering 
a system of public education for which they 
receive no private or corporate benefit; and 
that, as to tort liability, such agencies or 
authorities occupy a status different from that 
of municipal corporations which ordinarily have a 
dual character and which may exercise proprietary 
as well as governmental functions. 
[223 P.2d at 435]. [Emphasis added]. 
The Bingham court went on to observe: 
The reasons given by most courts in holding 
boards of education immune from liability for 
negligence center around the proposition that 
school boards act in connection with public 
education as agents or instrumentalities of the 
state, in the performance of a governmental 
function, and consequently they partake of the 
state's sovereignty with respect to tort 
liability. 
[223 P.2d at 436]. [Emphasis added]. 
Bingham implies that if a state agency were performing 
proprietary functions rather than governmental functions that 
such activities would not be immune. Similarly, in Campbell 
Bldg. Co. v. State Road Commission, 70 P.2d 857, 860 (Utcth 
1937), decided long before the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
was enacted, the Court seemed to imply its recognition of the 
distinction at common law. 
Moreover, the Utah legislature in passing the Act in 
1965 implicitly recognized the state was already liable for 
its proprietary activities. The legislature first provided in 
the Act for immunity with respect to governmental functions 
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and then waived that immunity with respect to certain 
governmental functions. If the state was not already liable 
with respect to proprietary functions, the original Act 
contained a serious omission because the Act only waived 
immunity with respect to certain governmental functions; the 
Act did not waive the immunity which Appellants would have 
this Court believe existed with respect to proprietary 
functions. 
Other states have recognized that the governmental/ 
proprietary distinction applies to the state. For example, in 
Herschel v. University Hospital Foundation, 610 P.2d 237 
(Okla. 1980), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the 
governmental/proprietary distinction was applicable to the 
state at common law. There the trial court ruled that the 
University Hospital was protected from liability for the death 
of a patient under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The 
state argued that the governmental/proprietary distinction 
applicable to municipalities was not applicable to the state. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected this contention, 
determined that the operation of the hospital was a 
proprietary function and that the state was therefore not 
protected under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, observing: 
The fundamental distinction as described in 
the dissent was attributed to James v. Trustees 
of Wellston Township . . . wherein the Court 
noted counties are but subdivisions of the state 
and a suit against the county is in effect a suit 
against the state, whereas cities are municipal 
corporations, voluntarily formed, and the 
sovereign immunity of the state in no way extends 
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to such corporations. Having resolved to apply 
the more than traditional protection of Article 
II, Section 6 of the Oklahoma Constitution, 
declaring a remedy for every wrong, to those 
factual instances where a tort is committed by a 
county, we now are constrained by the same 
analysis to find the state is similarly liable 
for injury occasioned by torts committed by the 
state arising from proprietary functions. Not to 
do so would deny a remedy to an Oklahoma citizen 
injured by the parent governmental authority and 
at the same time impose liability on governmental 
subdivisions of the state and municipal 
corporations for similar acts, thus imposing 
liability on all governmental entities save the 
largest, that being the sovereign. 
[610 P.2d at 241]. 
See also Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. Wainscott. 19 P. 328 
(Ariz. 1933); Union Trust Co. v. State of California, 99 P. 
183 (Cal. 1909); Henrv v. Okla. Turnpike Authority, 478 P.2d 
898, 901 (Okla. 1970); McCoy v. Kenosha County, 218 N.W. 348 
(Wis. 1928) (recognizing the governmental/proprietary 
distinction applies to the state itself and its accredited 
agents — counties, cities, villages, towns, school districts, 
etc.); Bakken v. State, 219 N.W. 834 (N.D. 1928) (rejecting 
argument that damages could not be recovered for personal 
injuries against the state of North Dakota, doing business as 
the North Dakota Mill & Elevator Association, for its 
negligent operation of a mill). 
As early as 1824, Chief Justice Marshall observed in 
Bank of United States v. Planter's Bank of Georgia, 24 U.S. 
904 (1824): 
It is, we think, a sound principle, that 
when a government becomes a partner in any 
trading company, it divests itself, so far as 
concerns the transactions of that company, of its 
sovereign character, and takes that of a private 
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citizen. Instead of communicating to the company 
its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends 
to a level with those with whom it associates 
itself, and takes the character which belongs to 
its associates, and to the business which is to 
be transacted. 
[Id. at 907]. 
Appellants cite cases from a few other states for the 
proposition that the governmental/proprietary distinction at 
common law did not apply to the state. Although these cases 
do contain such language, for the most part the statements in 
this regard are dicta. More importantly, it appears that 
these courts have been led to this conclusion merely because 
in earlier times the state only performed governmental 
functions and therefore there was no occasion to apply the 
distinction to the state. See, e.g., Green v. Commonwealth. 
435 N.E.2d 362, 365 (Mass. App. 1982). In any event, the 
cases cited by Appellants offer precious little rationale for 
not applying the governmental/proprietary distinction to the 
state and these cases should not be followed by this Court. 
It makes little sense in analyzing the immunity issue 
to differentiate based upon what governmental entity is 
involved. A proper analysis of this issue requires a 
determination of what activities performed by any governmental 
entity were immune at common law 100 years ago when the Utah 
Constitution was adopted. This is precisely the analysis 
undertaken in Condemarin, where Judge Durham recognized that 
the operation of a hospital by a governmental entity was not 
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immune at common law. Therefore, the legislature's attempt to 
restrict recovery of damages against a governmental entity 
operating a hospital violates the open courts provision of the 
Utah Constitution. The fact that prior to the adoption of the 
Constitution the state had not actually engaged in that type 
of activity is irrelevant. 
2. If the Governmental/Proprietary Distinction Were 
Not Applicable to the State at Common Law, the Damage 
Limitation Would Violate the Open Courts Provision Because 
State Employees Are Immunized Without a Reasonably Equivalent 
Substitute Remedy Being Provided. 
In arguing that the damage limitation does not violate 
the open courts provision, Appellants have entirely ignored an 
important issue discussed by this Court in Condemarin. 
Specifically, this court recognized that the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act immunizes all individual health care providers at 
the University Hospital from liability for their negligent 
acts or omissions, thereby unquestionably restricting an 
important right to recovery existing at common law. See Van 
Alstine, Governmental Tort Liability; A Decade of Change, 1966 
U.Ill. L.F. 919, 966-67 (citing Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-10 
(Supp 1965)). 
In Berry ex rel Berrv v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 
P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), this Court stated: 
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[S]ection 11 is satisfied if the law 
provides an injured person an effective and 
reasonable alternative remedy "by due course of 
law" for vindication of his constitutional 
interest. The benefit provided by the substitute 
must be substantially equal in value or other 
benefit to the remedy abrogated in providing 
essentially comparable substantive protection. 
[Id. at 680]. 
The Act would only be constitutional in this regard if 
it afforded the injured party a reasonably equivalent remedy. 
As Judge Durham noted in Condemarin; 
If we were prepared to sustain the recovery 
limitation, we would be constrained to conclude 
that this statutory provision fails the adequate 
substitution test of Berry. 
[775 P.2d at 361]. 
This Court in Condemarin only accepted the restriction on the 
common law right to sue health care providers because of the 
effective and reasonable alternative provided by the result of 
the Condemarin decision which permits full recovery against 
the hospital. 
The Governmental Immunity Act, containing a damage 
limitation that limits recovery against the state to 
$250,000.00f obviously does not provide a reasonably 
equivalent substitute remedy to injured parties for the right 
to recover unlimited damages against doctors and other health 
care providers. Thus, the damage limitation violates the open 
courts provision. 
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B. THE DAMAGE LIMITATION VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS AND 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES, 
Appellants argue that the damage limitation does not 
violate the due process or equal protection clauses, despite 
this Court's decision in Condemarin. for two reasons. First, 
Appellants argue that in Condemarin this Court mistakenly 
applied a heightened scrutiny standard in determining the 
constitutional issues because the Court mistakenly found that 
the damage limitation violated the open courts provision of 
the Utah Constitution and that the Court must apply a rational 
basis standard in judging the constitutionality of the damage 
limitation. Second, Appellants contend that the 1987 
Amendment avoided the constitutional problem with the damage 
limitation by simply redefining a "governmental function" as 
anything a governmental entity does. These arguments should 
be rejected by the Court. 
1. The Heightened Scrutiny Standard Was Properly 
Utilized in Condemarin and Should Be Applied in This Case. 
Hipwell has earlier demonstrated that this Court in 
Condemarin correctly determined that the damage limitation 
violated the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution. 
However, even if it were assumed for purposes of argument that 
the open courts provision had not been violated, the Court 
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properly utilized the heightened scrutiny standard in 
analyzing the equal protection and due process issues and 
properly determined that the damage limitation violates equal 
protection and due process. 
The Court did not base its utilization of the 
heightened scrutiny standard in its equal protection and due 
process analysis in Condemarin solely on the existence of a 
common law right to sue the state for injuries inflicted at a 
state-owned hospital. Rather, the Court recognized that the 
damage limitation severely restricted the important 
substantive right of an individual to recover for personal 
injuries. The Court noted that the classifications created by 
this statute interfered with the "fundamental principle of 
American law that victims of wrongful or negligent acts should 
be compensated to the extent that they have been harmed." 
[775 P.2d at 354]. The Court observed: 
The right to be [compensated] for personal 
injuries is a substantial property right, not 
only of monetary value, but in many cases 
fundamental to the injured person's physical 
well-being and ability to continue to live a 
decent life. 
[775 P.2d at 360]. 
Whether or not the damage limitation violated the open 
courts provision of the Utah Constitution, the fact remains 
that at the time the damage limitation was enacted by the 
legislature, the citizens of this state had a right to full 
recovery for injuries inflicted at a state-owned hospital. 
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The damage limitation drastically restricted that right. The 
heightened scrutiny applied by this Court in Condemarin to the 
classifications made by the legislature which interfered with 
the important right of individuals to recover for personal 
injuries was proper. Therefore, this Court's analysis of the 
equal protection and due process issues in Condemarin was 
correct regardless of whether the damage limitation violated 
the open courts provision. 
Appellants cite Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake. 
817 P.2d 816, 820-21 (Utah 1991), for the proposition that 
because this case does not involve a fundamental right or a 
suspect class, the Fourteenth Amendment only requires 
application of a rational basis standard. Greenwood, however, 
addressed whether a city animal control ordinance that 
discriminated against pit bulls violated the equal protection 
clause. Condemarin and the present case clearly involve a 
substantially more important right than did Greenwood. 
2. The Damage Limitation Violates the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses Even If the Rational Basis Standard 
is Employed. At the Very Least. Issues of Fact Exist. 
Even if this Court were to now employ a rational basis 
standard in analyzing the constitutionality of the damage 
limitation under the equal protection and due process clauses, 
the damage limitation is unconstitutional. 
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The only justification offered for the 1987 Amendment 
either on the floor of the legislature or by Appellants is the 
fiscal protection of the state treasury and the University 
Hospital. The 1987 Amendment, as with the predecessor 
statute, shifted the entire burden of catastrophic injury onto 
the shoulders of the catastrophically injured, those most in 
need of financial assistance. 
This Court noted in Condemarin that there was "no 
factual showing in the legislative history or the trial court 
that the recovery limitation is reasonably necessary for 
preservation of the public treasury," yet alone a showing that 
the limitation is "urgently and overwhelmingly necessary." 
Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 363. In fact, as this Court 
recognized in Condemarin. the state treasury justification has 
been roundly criticized: 
As with the medical malpractice crisis, 
those affected by the current dilemma in 
municipal liability have identified the tort 
system as the root of the problem. The two-fold 
premise associated with this crisis is that 
default lies in the tort system, and that 
limitations on the rights of victims are 
necessary in order to alleviate the problem. 
Without more, acceptance of this premise requires 
a leap of faith because the means-end connection 
is essentially unsupported. The premises fails 
because it is neither guaranteed nor likely that 
limiting the rights of victims will produce the 
benefits envisioned by the legislatures. 
[775 P.2d at 362 n.10]; Note, Target Defendants and Tort Law 
Reform: A Perspective on Medical Malpractice and Municipal 
Liability, 11 Vt.L.Rev. 535, 537, 542 (footnotes omitted). 
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Nor is there any showing in this case that the amount 
of the $250,000.00 damage limitation has a reasonable basis as 
required by the cases. See, e.g., Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 363 
(calling on legislature to "settle upon and justify an 
approximate figure demonstrated to be large enough to 
compensate a majority of injuries (minor and serious) but not 
so large as to threaten or ensure insolvency in response to 
one judgment or a major catastrophe"); Arneson v. Olson, 270 
N.W.2d 125, 135 (N.D. 1978) ($300,000.00 damage cap held 
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds as an 
unreasonably low amount and as failing to promote the stated 
legislative aims underlying its enactment). 
Moreover, a constitutional and much less drastic 
alternative was available and was, in fact, in use during the 
period following Condemarin up until the 1991 amendments were 
enacted. Senator Barlow stated the following on the floor of 
the Senate: 
When the cap was removed by the underlying 
Condemarin decision, the University of Utah 
Medical Center was forced to buy commercial 
insurance. In order to pay their premiums, which 
totalled approximately $1 million a year, the 
hospital increased patient fees by $40.00 per 
person. 
Floor Debate on Senate Bill 53, January 29-30, 1991 (Statement 
of Sen. Barlow). Senator Barlow precisely identified the 
manner in which private hospitals budget for and pay large 
malpractice judgments. Moreover, nothing in the legislative 
history even suggests that spreading the cost of malpractice 
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insurance to University Hospital patients in any way 
threatened the hospital or the state finances. Even under a 
rational basis standard, it is hardly rational or 
constitutional to burden the catastrophically injured with the 
costs of their misfortune when all patients of the University 
Hospital can share the burden of indemnifying the Hospital and 
the state treasury or when the cost of malpractice insurance 
could be even further defrayed by passing the burden on to all 
taxpayers. This is especially true when the state legislature 
has, at the same time, made a decision to strip individuals of 
their absolute right to sue other individual health care 
providers. 
In the present case, Appellants made no showing in the 
court below that the damage limitation was necessary to 
preserve the public treasury. As this Court recognized in 
Condemarin, no such showing can be made. At the very least, 
issues of fact exist in this regard. In this connection, 
discovery in this case had only recently commenced when 
Appellants filed their Motions for Summary Judgment and no 
discovery had been conducted on the necessity for the damage 
limitation. 
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3. The 1987 Amendment Did Not Cure the Constitutional 
Problems With the Damage Limitation, 
Appellants' argument that the 1987 Amendment avoided 
the constitutional problems with the damage limitation found 
in Condemarin by defining everything any government entity 
does to be a governmental function is grounded upon the 
fundamentally flawed assumptions that Condemarin only found 
the statutory damage cap unconstitutional because the prior 
statute did not define the operation of the University 
Hospital as a governmental function and that the legislature 
has plenary power to define "governmental function." 
This argument is wrong because: (a) this Court in 
Condemarin did not hold that the damage limitation was 
unconstitutional only because the Governmental Immunity Act 
purported to extend immunity beyond governmental entities 
performing a governmental function. Rather, the Court held 
that other classifications in the statute rendered the damage 
limitation as applied to the University Hospital 
unconstitutional; and (b) the legislature cannot arbitrarily 
define everything as a "governmental function" and even if it 
could that would not affect what was considered to be a 
"governmental function" at common law. 
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(a) Condemarin Did Not Strike Down the Damage 
Limitation Only Because the Operation of a Hospital 
Was Not Defined as a Governmental Function, 
First, the Court was careful in Condemarin to analyze 
the classification of governmental functions under § 63-30-
3(2) separately from the constitutionality of the statutory 
damage limit.1 The Court further observed that the state's 
argument wrongly "collapse[d] the [governmental function] 
classification issue into the recovery limits question" and 
went on to state: 
.The amounts contained in the recovery limits 
statutes created yet another classification in 
addition to [the governmental function 
classification] summarized above. Not only are 
victims of medical malpractice by government 
personnel treated differently from victims of 
private tortfeasors, but also there are 
classifications within the victim group itself 
. . . [T]hose whose economic losses exceeded the 
statutory limit are precluded from even 
recovering out-of-pocket costs resulting from 
their injuries. The present case illustrates how 
grave the disparity between the limit and actual 
costs may be. . . . The recovery cap created the 
distinction between victims of governmental 
tortfeasors, depending on the severity of their 
injuries: the mildly injured receive all; the 
moderately injured, most; and the severely 
injured, only a fraction or none of their 
economic and/or non-economic damages. 
[775 P.2d at 353]. 
1
 The Condemarin court did not hold § 63-30-3 
unconstitutional, but only § 63-30-34 as applied to the University 
Hospital. Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 352-54. 
33 
The Court characterized the classification imposed by 
the statutory damage limit as: 
[a]n indirect classification of injured 
victims which depends on whether their losses are 
less than, equal to, or greater than the 
statutory recovery cap and on whether those 
losses are largely economic, largely pain and 
suffering, or both. 
[775 P.2d at 354]. 
Justice Stewart also viewed the damage limitation as a 
violation of equal protection, stating: 
The cap on liability imposed by § 63-30-34 
creates at least two classes of hospital 
patients. One class consists of patients 
negligently injured at a governmentally owned 
hospital who are entitled to limited recovery, 
and another class is composed of patients 
negligently injured at a private institution who 
are entitled to full recovery. The critical 
issue is whether denying the constitutional right 
to some and not to others actually and 
substantially protects the public treasury from 
unreasonable depletion . . . . While there will 
be some additional expenditures incurred by the 
hospital's liability for full damages, there is 
no reason to believe that the cost cannot be 
covered as present liabilities. 
[775 P.2d at 373]. 
Justice Durham described the due process violation in 
Condemarin: 
Having first expanded immunity and then 
waived it, the legislature set out to accord the 
victims of governmental tort-feasors the same 
status as victims of private tort-feasors. With 
the recovery cap, however, the legislature has in 
effect retracted the waiver of immunity for the 
seriously injured. The statute directly 
prohibits those who are injured from recovering 
compensation for proven injuries solely because 
those injuries have been inflicted by government 
health care providers. 
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[775 P.2d at 361]. 
As Justice Zimmerman pointed outf "[t]he 
constitution's drafters understood that the normal political 
process would not always protect the common law rights of all 
citizens to obtain remedies for injuries." Id. at 367 (citing 
Berry ex rel Berrv v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. Ill P.2d 670, 677 
(Utah 1985)). Justice Zimmerman concluded: 
[TJhere can be no question that the 
legislation at issue, which severely restricts 
the right of every citizen to recover even actual 
out-of-pocket losses, both from a narrow category 
of health care providers who are the actual 
malefactors and from their governmental employer, 
substantially infringes upon those interests 
specifically protected by Article I, Section 11. 
[775 P.2d at 368]. [Citation omitted].2 
The legislature's purported redefinition of 
"governmental function" in the 1987 Amendment did nothing to 
cure these other classification problems identified in 
2
 The Supreme Courts of other states have struck down damage 
limits related to governmental immunity statutes on similar equal 
protection and due process grounds. See, e.g., Ryszkiewicz v. City 
of New Britain, 479 A.2d 793 (1984) (statute struck under rational 
basis of review); Flax v. Kansas Turnpike Auth. , 596 P. 2d 446 
(1979) (statute struck under rational basis of review). Moreover, 
the discriminatory classifications inherent in any medical 
malpractice damage limitation have been the basis for a substantial 
majority of courts to invalidate such limits, "usually on equal 
protection grounds, but also occasionally under a due process 
rubric." Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 361. See, e.g., Coburn ex rel. 
Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F.Supp 983, 997 (D.Kan. 1985); Waggoner v. 
Gibson, 647 F.Supp 1102, 1107 (N.D.Tex. 1986); Wright v. Central 
Du Page Hosp. Ass'n., 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 (1976); Kansas 
Malpractice Victims v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251 (Kan. 1988); Carson v. 
Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 838 (N.H. 1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 
125, 136 (N.D. 1978). 
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Condemarin as violating the equal protection and due process 
clauses. The damage limitation remains unconstitutional. 
(b) The Legislature Could Not Constitutionally 
Define Everything Any Government Entity Does As a 
Governmental Function. 
Second, the legislature cannot by fiat make everything 
a governmental function and thereby extend the cloak of 
governmental immunity to anything any governmental entity 
does. To take an easy case, if the state opened a public 
restaurant in competition with private enterprise, it would be 
foolish to argue that the restaurant was immune from liability 
because it was engaged in a governmental function. 
This Court has made it abundantly clear that the 
standard for determining what is a governmental function is 
whether the activity under consideration is of such a unique 
nature that it can only be performed by a governmental agency 
or is essential to the core of governmental activity. In 
Condemarin, Justice Stewart recognized that the operation of 
the University Hospital is not a governmental function in the 
constitutional sense and that the legislature, by enacting a 
statute, could not resolve the constitutional issue as to what 
is and is not a governmental function. In that regard, 
Justice Stewart observed, "the central concept of the doctrine 
[governmental immunity] is that immunity should exist for 
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governmental activities that are integral to the governing 
process so that they will not be jeopardized." [775 P.2d at 
371]. Justice Stewart then went on to address the 
constitutionally required test for a governmental function: 
Standiford formulated the following test for 
determining whether governmental immunity 
applies: "whether activity under consideration 
is of such a unique nature that it can only be 
performed by a governmental agency or that it is 
essential to the core of governmental activity" 
. . . by restricting somewhat the scope of 
governmental immunity, the test implemented the 
legislative intent to allow "more innocent 
victims injured by tortious conduct on the part 
of public entities access to the Courts for 
redress" . . . beyond that, the test articulates 
the core value protected by governmental immunity 
- providing protection to the public treasury and 
tax revenues against overwhelming losses so that 
the essential functions of government will not be 
imperiled. The test also identifies where the 
constitutional right of a person to have a remedy 
for personal injury begins under Article I, § 11 
of the Utah Constitution as against a 
governmental agency, and where the governmental 
right to immunity from such lawsuits stops. 
[775 P.2d at 371-72]. 
In that respect, Justice Stewart continued: 
. . . In any event, the statute cannot resolve a 
constitutional issue. 
Thus the issue that emerges is whether the 
Legislature ran afoul of Article I, § 24 of the 
Declaration of Rights of the Utah Constitution by 
limiting the liability of an institution owned by 
government which performs non-governmental 
activities. 
[775 P.2d at 772] . 
Appellants1 notion that the legislature can, by 
convenience of a label, transform anything the government does 
into a "governmental function" and thus clothe it with 
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absolute immunity beyond any constitutional restriction is 
directly at odds with this Courtfs decision in Hansen v. Salt 
Lake County. 794 P.2d 838 (Utah 1990). There the Court 
interpreted the Utah Governmental Immunity Act to determine if 
flood control was absolutely immune without exceptions. In 
doing so, the Court noted that the term 
"governmental function" . . . is a term of art 
long in use by the Courts to define those 
activities of governmental entities to which 
common law governmental immunity applied, as 
opposed to "proprietary functions" of those 
entities, to which immunity did not apply. 
[794 P.2d at 842-43]. [Citations omitted]. 
In Hansen the Court noted, in reviewing the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, that: 
There was (and is) no place in the structure 
of the Act for a grant of absolute immunity. A 
grant of absolute immunity should logically have 
been placed in a separate section from the 
general grant of qualified immunity (Section 68-
30-3) or, more likely, accomplished by excepting 
the immunized activity from all of the waivers to 
which it would otherwise be subject if placed in 
the general granting section (Section 68-30-3). 
[794 P.2d at 844]. 
The Court then went on to note that although in Rocky 
Mountain Thrift Stores v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 
(Utah 1989), the Court found flood activities were 
governmental functions before the 1984 Amendment defined them 
as such, it would not have been clear to the legislature that 
the Court would so hold. In that regard, the Court stated: 
After our decision in Standiford and 
Johnson, the legislature could reasonably have 
doubted whether we would hold flood control 
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activities to be uniquely governmental in nature 
or essential to a core governmental activity. 
[794 P.2d at 844]. 
That statement clearly reaffirms the standard in Standiford 
for determination of the constitutional limits of governmental 
immunity and further reaffirms the Court's role in ultimately 
defining a "governmental activity" for constitutional 
purposes. 
In determining that the legislature intended to 
subject the immunity to statutory waivers, the court in Hansen 
stated: 
Our cases have consistently held that if 
alternative constructions of a statute are 
possible, we should adopt the one that leads to a 
minimum of constitutional conflict. 
[794 P.2d at 845]. 
If, as the Appellants assert, the legislature can 
immunize any activity by simply labeling it "governmental 
function," then it made no sense for the Court to speak in 
terms of minimizing "constitutional conflict." In point of 
fact, the Court went on to state: 
Although we are not treating constitutional 
claims here, other than one under Article I, 
Section 22 (no taking of private property without 
compensation), discussed below, we note that 
there may be other constitutional problems with 
the grant of absolute immunity for flood control 
activities, including possible conflicts with 
Article I, Section 7 (no deprivation of property 
without due process), 11 (open courts provision), 
18 (no impairment of obligation of contracts), 
and 24 (uniform operation of the laws). 
[794 P.2d at 845]. 
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Clearly this Court was stating unanimously there is not an 
unlimited right to governmental immunity and that it must be 
restricted to the traditional definition of "governmental 
function" which contains within it the ambit of core 
governmental functions. 
In fact, it is clear that neither the legislature nor 
Appellants themselves believed that the 1987 Amendment 
purporting to make everything a governmental function 
validated the statutory damage cap after Condemarin. The 
legislative history relating to the 1991 Amendment 
demonstrates that the legislature itself believed Condemarin 
constitutionally invalidated the expansion of governmental 
immunity contained in the 1987 Amendment. [Governmental 
Immunity Act — Act Expansion: Hearing on S.B. 53, 48th 
Legis. (1991) (taped transcript of floor debate)]. Indeed, 
the legislature's 1991 Amendment of § 63-30-3(2) purporting to 
define certain limited activities of the University Hospital 
as governmental functions because they are "unique or 
essential to the core of governmental activity" and the 1991 
enactment of a new damage limitation in Utah Code Annotated § 
63-30-34 flies in the face of any notion that the 1987 
Amendment validated the old damage limitation. Why would the 
legislature enact a statute purporting to make certain 
activities of the University Hospital a governmental function 
because they are "unique and essential" if all the activities 
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of the University Hospital had already been made a 
governmental function by the 1987 Amendment? 
When Appellants settled Mrs. Hipwell's injuries, they 
did not do so in the belief that the 1987 Amendment validated 
the damage limitation. Rather, they understood that the 
$250,000.00 damage limitation no longer applied after 
Condemarin. Appellants were right.3 
The cases which Appellants cite for the proposition 
that the legislature had the authority to reinstate 
governmental immunity for state-owned hospitals by including 
the activities of those hospitals within the definition of 
governmental function, including Brown v. Wichita State 
University, 547 P.2d 1015 (Kan. 1976), stand only for the 
proposition that after a court abrogates judicially imposed 
governmental immunity the legislature has the constitutional 
authority to reimpose governmental immunity provided that the 
act does not invade any constitutional rights. See, e.g.. 
Brown, 547 P.2d at 1021. 
3
 Even if it were assumed for argument that the 1987 Amendment 
did validate the damage limitation, there is at least a question 
of fact as to whether back in 1989, when Appellants settled Mrs. 
Hipwell's claim for $250,000.00, that they acted reasonably in view 
of the fact that neither the legal community nor the medical 
community believed that there was any longer any damage limitation 
in existence. In this regard, the University Hospital maintained 
malpractice insurance in force until the 1991 amendments were 
enacted. The evidence will demonstrate that when the settlement 
was reached in 1989, no one believed that the damage limitation 
applied to Mrs. Hipwell's injuries. 
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In this regard, Appellants cite Fritz v. Regents of 
University of Colorado. 586 P.2d 23 (Colo. 1978), for the 
proposition that a state has full authority to specify what 
actions may be brought against the state and its subdivisions. 
Fritz is hardly on point. There, plaintiff was challenging, 
as a violation of equal protection, the statutory requirement 
that an injured party give written notice of the claim to the 
state within ninety days after discovery of an injury. The 
court simply held that the notice requirement was a reasonable 
condition to the right to maintain an action against the 
state. 
Finally, even if it is assumed for argument that the 
legislature could constitutionally define everything that any 
governmental entity does as a governmental function, what the 
legislature did in 1987 could have no bearing on what was 
considered to be a governmental function at common law when 
the Utah constitution was adopted almost 100 years ago. There 
is absolutely no question but that under the common law the 
operation of a hospital was considered to be a proprietary 
function. Consequently, the legislature's attempt in 198 7 to 
limit recovery against a governmental entity for performance 
of a proprietary function violated the open courts provision 
of the Utah Constitution. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully 
submitted that Condemarin was correctly decided, that the 1987 
Amendment changed nothing and that the damage limitation as 
applied to the University Hospital is unconstitutional. The 
District Court's order denying summary judgment should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this £z>—day of November, 1992. 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Stephasl' B JJ Mitchel: 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of 
general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. 
In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors 
may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person 
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Section 1. [Three departments of government.] 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into 
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; 
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of 
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted 
Appendix A 
63-30-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages 
against a governmental entity or against an employee. 
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, em-
ployees, servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing 
body, members of a board, members of a commission, or members of 
an advisory body, student teachers certificated in accordance with 
Section 53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing 
services to members of the public in the course of an approved medi-
cal, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training pro-
gram, volunteers, and tutors, but does not include an independent 
contractor. 
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsec-
tion (2)(a), whether or not the individual holding that position re-
ceives compensation. 
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivi-
sions as defined in this chapter. 
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, opera-
tion, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or 
not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is char-
acterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental func-
tion, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential 
to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or 
could be performed by private enterprise or private persons. 
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed by any depart-
ment, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity. 
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of prop-
erty, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, or estate, 
j;hat would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent. 
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than property 
damage. 
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school dis-
trict, public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement 
or taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corpora-
tion. 
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any right, title, es-
tate, or interest in real or personal property. 
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office, depart-
ment, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, 
university, or other instrumentality of the state. 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental 
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise 
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or 
other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nurs-
ing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in 
either public or private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the con-
struction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental 
entities are considerecTtcTbe governmental functions, and governmental enti-
ties and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or 
damage resulting from those activities. 
Appendix B 
63-30-34L Limit of judgment against governmental entity 
or employee, 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for damages for 
personal injury against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a gov-
ernmental entity has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $250,000 for one person in 
any one occurrence, or $500,000 for two or more persons in any one occur-
rence, the court shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to the injury is characterized as gov-
ernmental. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for property damage 
against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity 
has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $100,000 in any one occurrence, the court 
shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the damage is characterized as governmental. 
(3) The damage limits established in this section do not apply to damages 
awarded as compensation when a governmental entity has taken or damaged 
private property without just compensation. 
